Fifty years after the end of World War II, many still find it hard to understand how doctors were persuaded to become willing agents of Nazi ideology. What can medical ethics learn from the history of this dark time?
In one area the answer is clear. The Helsinki standards for biomedical research involving human subjects are evidence of determined agreement that nothing remotely like the Nazi 'medical experiments' should ever happen again. But Murdoch (4) and Dorothy Emmet (5) , and most recently by the lawyer Joseph Vining, whose fine From Newton's Sleep, includes the following vignette (6).
'What does a person really want?
What does a person want? "I want to die," a person says. "No," comes the frequent response, "You don't. You are not being yourself." This you is not an immediate phenomenon heard materially here and now. This you is an existence over time, with a past and a potential, whose voice you listen for continuously while making judgment after judgment whether to respect or discount the words you hear one after another.' What Vining describes here, of course, is an ideal of the kind of conversation required for doctor and patient together to determine whether this is an occasion when allowing the patient to die, or (rarely, because there is often a better agreed alternative) assisting his or her death, is morally appropriate. Such ideals, Dorothy Emmet argues, can play a vital role in orienting practice towards goals or standards that can be approached even when they cannot be fully realised. Clearly there are occasions when it is not possible to realise the ideal, the most difficult being those concerning neonates. But this in turn is why many doctors, nurses and parents with profound experience of such occasions acknowledge that they are and always should be 'agonising' (7) .
History's lesson from the Nazi era may be that asking so much of doctors is asking too much of medical virtue. This may be the deepest reason why many doctors and others resist the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia. But history is much longer than the Nazi era, and our dismay over that era is a tribute to countless other doctors whose practice has been oriented by imperfectly realisable ideals. It is also worth noting Burleigh's observation that the doctors who collaborated with the Nazis received little or no education in medical ethics and some argued that 'everything was relative, including codes of medical ethics' (8) . Medical education today is beginning to take teaching in ethics, communication and practice skills more seriously. This cannot ensure that all future doctors, when patients (whether or not voluntary euthanasia is legalised) ask to be allowed or helped to die, will invariably respect the moral boundary between first and third person judgments. But it should help orient their practice towards that ideal; and that will be one small step in the direction of learning from history.
